LAST week the chairman of the Press Council, Professor David Flint, called for an attack on the contempt law that fines and jails journalists for refusing to disclose confidential sources.
He thought the use of the implied freedom of political communication in the Constitution enunciated in the High Court last year should be used to this end. That freedom was used to strike out the Federal law restricting political advertisements in the electronic media at election time.
At the time the case came down, commentators thought it would be used in other cases to expand the right of free speech. It was fairly clear, however, that it could not be used to attack defamation laws because they provide, albeit in a very limited form, defences that enable free political communication. They strike a balance between an individual’s right to reputation against the public right to know, even if cogent arguments could be made that the balance is too heavily weighted in favour of the former. Further, communication is not prohibited before the event, it merely has to be justified afterwards.
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