THE news this week that Indonesia is to buy submarines from South Korea with a view to eventually importing enough technology to start building their own in the near future must be quite depressing for the Australian Defence Force.
While Indonesia plans aggressively to go from importing submarines to building its own, Australia seems to be passively sliding from having its own Australian-built submarines to importing something off the shelf from abroad, or importing something and then modifying it.
First we were toying with importing a Japanese sub, with attendant bad messages to China, then a German one – almost laughable given the difference in the length of the coastline of each nation.
A lot of popular commentary has belittled Australia’s submarine effort – the construction and support of the Collins class submarine.
The commentary went along the lines that Collins proved that Australia was hopeless at this sort of thing. So if the Navy boys must have this type of toy, it would be cheaper, quicker and easier just to buy it off the shelf somewhere.
The supporting argument went along the lines that Australia is about to close its car industry and rely on much better and cheaper imports, so why not do the same with the submarine?
Pardon the pun, but those arguments do not hold water.
For a start, the laws of comparative trade tell us that using subsidies to compete with countries that can produce cars more efficiently is wasteful. Producing hundreds of thousands of units that do essentially the same thing is completely different from producing just 12 highly specialised units for Australia’s unique needs.
Facts and logic should point us to the proposition that if we do not build the replacement for the Collins class in Australia, there is little point in having a submarine fleet at all.
We should ask why do we need a submarine fleet? Range and endurance, independence, stealth, potency and deterrence.
In 2000, HMAS Collins went — without escort — from the west coast to the east coast of Australia, then to Hawaii, to Alaska and the west coast of Canada and the US and then back home.
In all, it was 21,000 nautical miles (39,000 kilometres) over 185 days, nearly all of which was underwater.
The question we should be asking is not whether we should build the next class of subs here, but why don’t we make them nuclear-powered?
The stealth of submarines makes them ideal for intelligence gathering and adds to their deterrent value.
In an ideal world, of course, it would be much better to rely on diplomacy and distance to ensure our security. But it is not an ideal world.
We have to ask what sort of weaponry do we need to protect our very long shipping lanes from hostile intent and to provide deterrence before hostile intent arises.
We have to look at what we would be giving up if we closed our ability to make submarines and imported them instead.
Giving up a car industry is of little moment. Lots of developing countries make cars, and a car industry is easy enough to restart if imports were blocked and you really had to.
Building submarines is different. Submarines operate in the most difficult environment on the planet – no air; lots of pressure; lots of corrosive salt water, and dire consequences if anything goes wrong.
It is a great tribute to Australian planning, ingenuity, technical attainment and determination that we have managed to build and maintain our own submarines for the best past of the past half century. We would be very foolish to surrender that capacity.
Better questions should be asked than: Wouldn’t it be better to buy off the shelf?
Better questions would be: How can we contain the costs of Australian construction? How can we draft better initial requirements so that the latest fad or brainstorm from Russell does not add millions in redesign costs? How can we prevent contractors and labour forces from eyeing off the ripe plum of a defence job to milk it for all it is worth (pardon the mixed metaphor)?
Australia’s technical capacity is not really an issue here. It is more our administrative capacity. After all, ultimately, the Collins class submarine works and works well.
Of course, the media has a lot to answer for. Media tends to highlight things that go wrong. If they go right it is not news.
Also, media likes “currency” – an on-going story. Things going wrong with Collins became an on-going story, so each little thing that went wrong was given greater prominence than it really deserved. Each story might well have been completely accurate, but the overall impression was misleading.
Then we have the ingrained tall-poppy syndrome and “imported-is-better” myth that became ingrained in consumer markets in Australia until fairly recently.
Public opinion affects what governments do, often before governments ask whether popular opinion is well-informed or whether it could be turned around if not well-informed.
For example, the decision to reject nuclear-powered subs is based almost purely on public opinion. The only virtue of rejecting nuclear power is that it prevents us taking the latest of whatever the US has on offer – the usual blinkered approach of Australian defence procurement.
What we should guard against now is mis-guided public opinion killing something of great value in Australia and putting us at the mercy of a foreign provider.
Even with something as simple as cars, we know how the manufacturer holds consumers over a barrel with maintenance and the supply of spare parts. With something as specialist and complex as a submarine it would be far worse.
Moreover, being reliant on a foreign supplier to keep your submarines . . . er . . . underwater defeats the very purpose of having them – independent, secure defence assets that work for you.
Australia has built up huge expertise in submarine manufacture. Yes, mistakes were made during the development of Collins, but that should be seen as valuable experience, not an excuse to give up.
In short, any money saved by buying off the shelf would be more than lost by being beholden to a foreign supplier for maintenance and support and by losing Australian skills and Australian contract business.
More briefly, build the subs in Australia or not have them at all.
CRISPIN HULL
This article first appeared in The Canberra Times on 11 October 2014.
Crispin – you have some mixed similes there. We should not compare cars but rather aircraft with submarines. Neither ALP or Coalition now require our military or airline aircraft to be built in Australia though we do very well at making sophisticated parts for these for use both here and worldwide.
Pacific Defence Reporter last month had a very insiteful article pointing out that France, Germany and Japan have maintained a continuous investment in submarine development, design and manufacture that included all the associated industries. Australia last did that when the HMAS Rankin the last Collins was built 14 years ago but the stopped doing this continuous investment.
Just look at how the much briefer gap between the production of ANZAC Class frigates – HMAS Perth the last of these was launched in 2006 – and the Air Warfare Destroyer program commenced in 2007. Now 7 years later, at least 2 years behind schedule and $800M in the red, that small gap has cost us BIG time. Just imagine what 14 years of submarine production lapse will cost.
Finally please remember that the Scottish built Oberon Class submarines we operated before Collins were successfully maintained and modified in Australia.