Mal Meninga’s entrance into the local political fray invites a look at what might happen at the election due in October and some unintended weakness of the ACT’s version of the Hare-Clarke electoral system.
The ACT has three electorates: Molonglo (in the centre) with seven members; Brindabella (based on Tuggernaong) with 5 and Ginninderra (based on Belconnen) with 5.
The seven-member seat has a quota of 12.5 per cent (one-eighth of the vote). It means if you get 1.5 per cent of the first preference vote you get elected. Meninga is standing in Molonglo. In the two five-member seats the quota is 16.6 per cent one sixth of the vote). It means if you get 16.6 per cent of the first preference vote you get a seat.
In fact, minor-party candidates and independents rarely get a quota on first preference votes. Successful minor candidates (by minors I mena independents and minor parties) usually require preferences from eliminated candidates – both minors and major-party canidates. Bear in mind the majors always stand a full complement of five or seven in each seat and only two or three are successful.
A lot of the focus in the ACT is on the minor candidates — which ones of them will pick up enough vote to get a seat and hold the balance of power.
But when you look at the prospects for the major parties, you can see the Territory is at least two-thirds in a gridlock.
Let’s look at the situation in the two five-member electorates.
But first to a definition. I want to use the term expected-preference vote. This is different from the two-party preferred vote where every vote is notionally award to one or other of the major parties because one or other wins virtually every seat in elections for the House of Representatives.
In the ACT the expected-preference vote is the first-preference vote plus the preference of candidates (major and minor) who will be eliminated early in the count.
So Paul Osborne’s expect preference vote would be about 17 per cent (11 per cent first preference plus 6 per cent of early preferences of eliminated candidates).
To get a seat in a five-member electorate you need 16.6 per cent expected-preference vote. To get two seats you need 33.2 per cent. To get three of the five seats you need 49.8 per cent expected-preference vote. Guess what. Each of the major parties will nearly all of the time get somewhere between 33.2 and 49.8 expected-preference vote. They virtually never sink below 33.2 per cent (say about 25 per cent of the primary vote plus 8 per cent of preference for early-eliminated minor) and they will always be stretchign beyond their limits to get 49.8 per cent.
What does this mean? Well, the two major parties will each get two and only two seats in eachof the five-member electorates – no matter how poorly or well they do in relation to each other.
A really low Labor vote in 1998 for example, when Wayne Berry led Labor that was seen to be tomato red, still resulted in two seats in each of Ginninderra and Brindabella. And the Liberals score more than 10 percentage points more than Labor in those two electorates, still only got exactly he same number of seats as Labor – two in each electorate.
In 2001, the boot might be on the other foot. Jon Stanhope’s might get significantly more votes than the Liberals — in Ginninderra particularly – yet will still get exactly the same number of seats as the Liberals, namely two in each of Ginninderra and Brindabella. (I will bet a bottle of the best red to any mug willing to bet that next election — and every election while they remain five-member seats — the Liberals and Labor will each get two and only two seats each in each of Brindabella and Ginninderra.)
This is a very significant aberration in the ACT Hare-Clark system. Despite up to a 16 per centage point difference between the major parties they will get exactly the same number of seats in Ginninderra and Brindabella. Even a five percentage point difference in other systems (both single member and proportional) would result in a landslide one way or the other).
It means that the major parties can forget Ginninderra and Brindabella. The result is pre-ordained.
Only one seat counts in determining which major party gets the most seats – Molonglo.
To get two seats in Molonglo a major party needs 25 percent of the expect-preference vote (a lay-down misere). To get three, it needs 37.5 per cent. That is within the range of possibilities. Indeed, it is likely for the major party that performs the better of the two. And once on party gets 37.5 per cent of the expected-preference vote if it unlikely that the other major will also get that amount, given that you could expect the Greens to pick up 12.5 per cent and lock in a seat and one other minor two lock in another seat, leaving the majors to share the 75 per cent left.. Remember the expected-preference vote is not a simplistic as a two-party preferred vote which share the whole 100 per cent of the vote between the two majors.
So the major party that does better than the other in Molonglo will get minors seats in total (two in each of the five-member electorates and three in Molonglo). The other major party will get six seats (two in each electorate). There will be four minors. One each in Ginninderra and Brindabella and two in Molonglo.
In theory the major party with the most seats attracts the support of the minors to form government. Those same minors then rightly retain the option to vote however they want on legislation.
But if Meninga wins a seat he will join Paul Osborne (Brindabella) and Dave Rugendyke Ginninderra) in a populist, policy-free, vote-for-me-I’m a good block and/or footballer alliance. The three together can determine which major party governs irrespective of whether it has six or seven seats, because three plus six equals nine which is a majority in a 17-seat Parliament. In such an environment the four minors have a huge say. Inded, they choose who governs and have a very large say in what legislation goes through.
Such a parliament might never vote to exand to a 21-seat Parliament of three seven-member electorates, which would be a far better set-up to reflect the views of voters.
As we have seen, in a seven-member electorate there is a significant contest between the major parties as to which one gets three and which one gets just two seats. A typical expected-preference result for a major party hovers between the 25 and 37.5 per cent. So an expanded Parliament to three seven-member electorates would provide a contest between the major parties across the ACT – not just in Molonglo. A party winning three seats in each electorate would have nine or 21 seats, needing just two or an expected six minor candidates to forma government. Even though there would be more minors, they would have less influence in determining who governed. That would be decided more in the head-to-head contest between the major parties, as it should. The minors would still have influence over legislation and with the Opposition would be a restraining influecne over abuse of power.
Far from handing more power to the minors, an increased Assembly would provide a better mix of power between the minors and the major parties, putting the real contest between the majors at the abllot box where it belongs, rather than in the scramble post-election to gather the support of fewer, but more powerful independents. A major party with three more seats than its rival (as is likelyin a 21-seat Parliament) will almost automatically gain government, because the “”losing” major would need five of six minors to govern. A major party with just one seat more (as the present seat allocation almost guarantees) is vulnerable to a deal between the “”losing” major party and three of four minors.
The Meninga candidacy helps show that.