Dave Rugendyke did the decent thing, up to a point. Last Friday week he warned Chief Minister Kate Carnell that he would vote against her in any no-confidence on Bruce Stadium.
He could have done what he did in the no-confidence motion 15 months ago. He could have kept his view to himself until it came time to vote. Instead, he was upfront immediately. But he also gave Carnell and the Liberals more than a week’s warning.
And as the cliché goes, a week is a long time in politics.
Last time Rugendyke told us that he had gone into the Chamber debate having not made up his mind. He wanted to hear what was said first. This time, though, he had read the Auditor-General’s report and made up him mind.
Having made up his mind, he must have been concerned about the relentless pressure that would be put upon him by the Labor and Liberal Parties, so why not avoid it by making it irrevocable. Also, it would give the Liberals a week or so to abandon their Kate-or-nothing approach, under which the Liberals said that if the no-confidence motion were successful, they would not stand another Liberal as Chief Minister and Government would pass to Labor. Perhaps that is slowly working.
The other critical independent, Paul Osborne, decided much later that he would also vote for no-confidence, when it would make no difference. Presumably, he could not persuade Mr Rugendyke to allow Carnell to stay.
Osborne was thinking further ahead politically. The political danger in calling the Liberals’ bluff was that the Liberals would hold fast and there would be a change of Government. Inevitably, there would be a short honeymoon and then Labor would make mistakes. And who would get blamed for these mistakes? Paul Osborne and Dave Rugendyke. So Osborne would not like Labor in office right now. After an election it would be a different matter because the people would have put them in power.
This is why Osborne came up with the idea of having an election now.
The constitutional niceties are irrelevant for his constituency. On the other hand, someone like Michael Moore would be wrestling with them as a long-time proponent of proportional voting and constitutional limits to executive power.
So what are the pros and cons of an early election. It is quite fundamental constitutional stuff and it is a prime example of the basic difference between republicanism and constitutional monarchy.
The theory of a monarchy is that the monarch rules by divine right. Over the years the monarch has devolved power to Parliament and the Executive Government. In Australia the monarch figure is the Governor-General. The monarch figure chooses the Prime (or Chief) Minister and can sack him or her and on the Prime Minister’s advice appoints and dismisses ministers and agrees to election dates. It is a God-down system, albeit an highly evolved one with lots of practical roles for elected people. In the monarchical system the monarch (or Governor-General) can choose the election date, without any reference to the people’s elected representatives. Though usually the date is selected by the Prime Minister who has the support of a majority of those representatives.
The ACT polity is not like this. There is no monarchical/Governor-type position. The ACT Self-Government Act says the ACT is a body politic under the Crown, but in fact it is a classic Republic with strongly separated powers. In such a system, there has to be clear rules so there is no need for a King or Governor. In particular, there have to be clear rules on the selection and dismissal of the Chief Executive or Chief Minister and clear rules on election dates. This is because these are the two woolly areas where the reserve powers of the Crown still hover.
In the United States Republic, the rules of selecting and axing the President and electing the Congress (or Parliament) are very precise. They have worked for 225 years. That is 225 years of fixed term Parliaments and fixed dates for elections.
It is critical for the democratic working of such a Republic, that the people’s representatives have a check against the Executive.
An early election sounds democratic, but it is not. Unfixed elections hand power to the Executive over the people’s representatives. The timing can be manipulated. An Executive feeling pressure from the legislative representatives can use the threat of an early election to bring them to heel. Or it can call an early election to obviate the need to be accountable to the people’s representatives.
A lot of this theory is lost when you look at the practices of Australian Federal politics. The Executive Government of the day invariably has a comfortable majority and is never under threat of accountability to the people’s representatives.
However, in a proportional system such as that in the ACT, majority government is rare. Governments are minorities and rely on support from independents or even the Opposition to get legislation through or to get approval for Executive action. It makes the Executive Government more accountable. In a proportional system the will of the elected representatives reflects fairly accurately the will of the people.
He fixed term, therefore, becomes fundamental in a system where there is no Governor and where there is proportional voting.
We don’t know the detail of proposals to allow early elections in the ACT. But once you allow that discretion it has to vest somewhere. If it vests in the Chief Minister it will get abused as it does elsewhere: the date is kept secret as long as possible to surprise opponents or fiscal bounty is shed according to election timing.
You elect MLAs for a fixed term. They choose the Chief Minister. If a majority of them want a different Chief Minister – for whatever reason – that is quite democratic. The majority may not like policy direction. They may object to some Executive action. They may, as here, paint it as a vote of misconduct. No matter. A majority of the people’s representatives are entitled to decide it and take the flak at the next election.
But these matters of high principle will be the last consideration of those cobbling together a majority to change the electoral law. They will be looking at self-preservation first, as they always do. This is why it is so important to have the critical parts of the Constitution locked in so they cannot be changed except by referendum or special (say three-quarters) majority.
If Rugendyke and Osborne are going to vote against Carnell, the 17 MLAs have a duty to elect a new Chief Minister, or re-elect Carnell.