A large amount of public disquiet has greeted the verdicts in the Saudi diplomat murder case. There were two immediately disconcerting elements of the case in the eyes of the public. The first is that a man pleaded guilty to being accessory after the fact of murder and is serving a jail term, reduced after the judge took into account that fact that he would give evidence for the prosecution. The second is that one of the accused attempted to plead guilty to manslaughter during the trial, but the judge refused to accept the plea, describing it as premature. A later element to come out was the nature of evidence excluded by the judge from the jury. That evidence included several witnesses who said they were the recipients of confessions to the killing by one of the accused. In the light of this the average non-lawyer is puzzled, if not outraged.
The case has led the Attorney-General, Gary Humphries, to look at the possibility of legislating to provide for appeals against jury acquittals and to look at the Evidence Act. Mr Humphries also suggested the possibility of a coronial inquiry to clear the air and to consider laying fresh changes against the accused. It was a bit of a scatter-gun approach, perhaps understandable politically in the face of public outrage. However, Mr Humphries should take some time for further reflection before acting on all of the suggestions. Opposition Leader, Jon Stanhope, with the advantage of a further day’s reflection, has rightly come out against the suggestion of appeals against a jury verdict of acquittal. “”I don’t think we should overturn a really fundamental principle like that as a knee-jerk reaction . . . to an individual case.” Mr Stanhope’s position is a welcome one and a rare one among politicians who jump aboard the law-and-order bandwagon with too much alacrity.
Mr Stanhope went further, though, in suggesting that he had no doubt that the jury made the correct decision based on the evidence presented and that the 12 members of the jury were being unfairly regarded, slighted and their integrity questioned. That conclusion is not a good reading of the public mood. Not many people are saying the jury did a bad job. Rather they are saying the jury was hamstrung by having the judge rule out so much evidence. On this point Mr Humphries is on the right track. A review of the Evidence Act is required as is a review of its application in this case. If the Evidence Act is making the jury’s task too difficult, it should be reviewed. Perhaps that review might wait any appeal on points of law by the DPP to see whether the Federal Court agrees with the rulings of evidence given by Justice Higgins. The DPP can appeal on points of law, but it will not affect the result.
Mr Humphries, however, takes his case too far in seeking appeals from jury acquittals and in questioning whether those acquitted can be charged with other offences. There is a human-rights question here. People should not be subjected to double jeopardy. Once acquitted by a jury that should be it. And it is inappropriate to be dreaming up a second round of charges when it is open to a jury in a murder case to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter. It is for the DPP to get the charges right in the first place and not to have a second crack at the same defendants over the same events with new charges.
Given the high-profile nature of this case, Mr Humphries should consider whether a coronial inquest where all the evidence will be admissible would help relieve public disquiet.