The decolonisation period in the Indonesian archipelago is not over with the independence of the former Portuguese enclave of East Timor.
True that enclave had an existence as a Portuguese territory for 30 years after Indonesia became an independent nation after centuries of Dutch rule, so it was ripe for a separate existence because it had developed its own culture after 400 years of Portuguese rule. However, the people of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago did not necessarily get cohesion and unity merely by having the common background of being under Dutch colonial rule for a long time. The archipelago contains hundreds of different ethnic, religious and linguistic throughout its thousands of islands. Until President Suharto resigned two years ago, the archipelago was held together under the Indonesian Republic by a combination of the threat of force and gradual economic improvement. As the economy faltered people began to question corruption and the lack of democracy. Suharto’s days were numbered. The election 1ate last year gave the new President Addurrahman Wahid democratic legitimacy, even if the electoral process was somewhat flawed. However, his government did not inherit a legacy of the rule of law and smooth running institutions. More significantly it did not inherit a military that was used to following orders from a democratically elected government. To the contrary, the military had a long history of taking a central role in politics and government.
This has made Wahid’s task immensely difficult. As a democrat his mere presence in the presidency has been a catalyst to local movements for democracy in Indonesia’s regions. Fuelled by the independence vote in East Timor, separatist movements have flourished. Most of them have had a religious elements. Most have involved acts of sustained violence.
Wahid has to find a way of satisfying the democratic aspirations of separatists without causing the wholesale break-up of the Indonesian nation. There would be little wrong with the latter if it could be done peacefully and without jeopardising economic progress. Mostly likely, that would not be possible.
It is quite apparent that the Army would not tolerate any further secessions after Timor. Senior army officers see their powerbase in a united Indonesia. It is somewhat puzzling therefore that many claim the army is stirring up strife in the regions. But it is probably true, even if it is a gamble. The army stirred up strife in Timor by giving weapons to the militia both before and after the vote. The motive is that strife requires military force to quell. It will make Wahid dependent on the army if he is to retain a united Indonesia. The gamble is that the violence might lead to the break-up of Indonesia, though that is tempered by the grim alternative that the threat of a break-up would provide an excuse for the army to move in and seize power. It might do that to avoid the fear of army officers being prosecuted for crimes against humanity in Timor and elsewhere.
That is now a real threat Wahid has to balance his need for the army to keep control but not to give it such a large role that he loses power.
In this environment it was folly for Britain to lift its arms embargo and wise for the United States to issue a firm warning to the army that a coup would be met with tough sanctions that would make their rule untenable. The US approach just might coax the army to favour co-operation with Wahid rather than overthrowing him.