The Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, was quick to take some Australian credit for the dramatic change of stand by the Indonesian Government over Timor last week. He asserted that a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, to the Indonesian Government expressing concern about Timor and the need to look at autonomy had helped changed the Indonesians’ minds about Timor. If that is so, it fairly damns Australian policy over the past 27 years, under both Labor and Coalition Governments. It means that the Australian view matters and that if from the moment Portugal deserted Timor in 1975 Australia had firmly insisted on an act of self-determination, then perhaps the past 27 years of death and torture might not have happened. Perhaps, even, the East Timorese might have voted for Indonesian sovereignty with local autonomy.
More likely, though, the change in the Australian position was only part of the reason for Indonesian change of heart.
Once the stubborn President Suharto was off the scene, leaders in Indonesia reviewed the equation. They saw falling international support because of Indonesia’s stand on East Timor; they saw a steadfastness in those opposing Indonesia’s stand; they saw a steadfastness in the resistance to Indonesian integration; and they saw and increasing economic cost in hanging on in East Timor which was not balanced by any oil revenue.
Oil, of course, along with a now unfounded fear of a communist enclave, was one of the main reasons for Indonesia being so tenacious about Timor.
Indonesia’s new stand has been greeted with cautious optimism. Indonesia says it will grant East Timor autonomy and if after an unspecified time the people of East Timor did not want to remain part of Indonesia, then they would get full independence. The announcement sounded encouraging. However, it lacked any detail on timing and on the mechanism through which the people of East Timor could express their opinion on whether they wanted to stay a part of Indonesia or go it alone. The critical question is whether the people of East Timor will get a chance to vote in an internationally supervised act of self-determination. That, unfortunately, seems unlikely. It is not as if Indonesia has woken up and thought, “”Gosh, we have been wrong for 23 years. We should never have invaded or annexed East Timor.” Rather it has said, East Timor is no longer worth the agony. It will just walk away, like Portugal before it.
But there is danger in what might happen in the meantime. Some East Timorese leaders are deeply suspicious that this might be just a trick to appease the international community. And that Indonesian forces will be intimidating locals into expressing support for continued integration with Indonesia with limited autonomy. That is perhaps being too suspicious. This is a major change of position for Indonesia and one in the right direction. Besides, the international community and the East Timorese leadership will not accept continued integration nor accept Indonesian sovereignty without an internationally recognised act of self-determination.
It seems, therefore, that Indonesia could well just walk away. Face might well require a voluntary surrender on Indonesia’s part rather than accept the humiliation of allowing a referendum result cause the severance of East Timor from Indonesia.
Australia must prepare for this possibility. There will be a power vacuum. There will be a minority seen as pro-Indonesian who will be vulnerable to revenge. There may be an exodus of refugees — most likely to Australia if the transition is not handled well.
Oddly enough, the economic viability of East Timor is not likely to be the headache many have made it out to be. Many very small nations do very well economically, carving themselves out niche markets; being flexible and having a community-spirited cohesiveness that larger nations lack.
Australia has a key position in the economic future of Timor. It has signed a treaty with Indonesia over oil and other resources in the Timor Gap. This will have to be renegotiated so that East Timor gets its fair share. Further, Australia will have to have a fairly generous outlook in terms of aid. If Indonesia walks, it will presumably not be very interested giving aid to East Timor. And it must be acknowledged that after centuries of Portuguese neglect, Indonesia made considerable economic and social effort in the territory, even if it came with unwelcome repression. Indonesia has got nothing out of the annexation economically and has little prospect of getting anything. That is why is has at last moved.
Oil revenues will be a long way for East Timor, too. And they should not be seen as an economic panacea. Nigeria and Angola are good examples of how large resources can be squandered.
Timorese Nobel Peace laureate Jose Ramos Horta is right, however, to be concerned about conditions on the ground in East Timor now. There is continued fighting and attacks by civilian militia armed by Indonesian forces. It seems the Indonesian Army has not got the political message being sent by the Indonesian leadership.
It would be better if Indonesia engaged in a more constructive dialogue over East Timor rather than a petulant ultimatum to accept integrated autonomy or be cast adrift. But that is too much to hope for, and given that is the case, Australia’s responsibility is that much greater. If Mr Downer is right and Australia’s recent missive had some beneficial effect, it indicates there are good ground for the Australian Government keeping up the pressure for an internationally acceptable outcome in East Timor.