There are a couple of worrying aspects to the report of Professor Philip Pettit into the Governance of the ACT. One of these — a new committee system — has already found its way into the practice of the ACT Legislative Assembly. Other elements of the Pettit report have much to commend them.
Professor Pettit recommended that the committee system be restructured to mirror portfolios, and this week the Assembly agreed. Previously committees covered broad policy areas which often ran across several portfolios. Their focus was not so much on what a department was doing or what did a Minister intend to legislate about, but how should the Assembly deal with a broad policy question. For example, feral animals, drugs, Year 12 testing, each might cross several portfolios, but each presented a discrete policy consideration.
And there were two crucial committees that each ran across the whole gamut of government. The Public Accounts Committee and the Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills and Subordinate Legislation. Virtually every democratic parliament in the world has committees like these two.
The Public Accounts Committee checks where the money went. It checks on fraud, reckless spending, inefficient and inappropriate spending. It asks the fundamental question: are taxpayers getting value for money. It builds up expertise in accounting across the field. And it does not have to reinvent the wheel as it investigates one area of government after another. It can chase down patterns of error and recommend new practices to be applied across the system. Moreover, it can liase with other public accounts committees and other auditors-general in Australian parliaments to gain from their experience. Indeed, an informal method of practice seems to have built up that one state might pursue one field, for example contracting out, while another deals with, for example, asset maintenance, and the intelligence gained is traded among committees.
The Scrutiny of Bills committee looks at how new legislation affects human rights in general and existing legislative rights. It has built up expertise in legal drafting and legislative interpretation. It can recommend and warn about poor drafting with unintended consequences across all areas of government.
The skills of these two committees (both MLAs and committee staff) cannot easily be done by a series of portfolio-shadowing committees. Of if they are, it will be a case of unnecessary duplication. These committees should be restored. Professor Pettit did not specifically recommend to abandon these, he just recommended the portfolio committees. But the assembly took the abandonment as implicit. There is nothing wrong with portfolio committees, provided they do not get too close to the bureaucrats they are supposed to be scrutinising. But the portfolio committees are not a satisfactory replacement for the Public Accounts and Scrutiny of Bills Committees.
Green MLA Kerrie Tucker argued strongly for their retention as a very important check on the executive government by other MLAs who put less importance on this kind of scrutiny.
The Pettit report has rightly recommended a modest increase in the amount of money spent on governance, in both for general support for the legislature and for some extra MLAs. It is an unpopular cause. It is difficult to sell a call for more politicians. But if we expect our politicians to be responsive to public demands and effective in their scrutiny of the executive government, there have to be enough of them. Saving on the cost of governance might be a false economy if an unresponsive legislature does not fulfil reasonable community desires or an unchecked executive misapplies tax-payers’ money.
At self-government in 1989 we had one MLA for every 10,000 people. If that ratio were maintained, we would now have 21. The Pettit recommended a minimum of five members per seat. If the ACT regained its third federal seat, three seven-member electorates could mirror them. There is an argument for smaller electorates to increase geographical identity and responsiveness. It would mean a 5-5-5-6. In any event, there should be a minimum of five members per electorate to given independents and minor parties a chance and the total should be odd — as Professor Pettit recommended.
The question of raising the number of MLAs raises a more fundamental question: where should the power to make significant changes to the ACT system governance lie? At present the ACT Self Government Act and two other Acts, all pieces of federal legislation, sets out much of the groundwork, including the number of MLAs and the term of the Assembly. That legislation also restricts the power of the Assembly to enact laws in certain fields and gives the Federal Government through the Governor-General power to veto laws.
The Pettit report rightly recommends that these arrangements be changed. When vetoing or legislating for the ACT, the Federal Government or Parliament should have to set out the reasons for federal interest in the matter. Also the report recommends that the ACT should be able to change elements of its governance in the same way as a state.
The patriation of the ACT’s “”Constitution” has merit, provided certain key elements are entrenched so that they require a referendum or a two-thirds majority of the Assembly to change. Where the people’s representation is being significantly affected or politicians are getting more power, there should be a referendum.
The Pettit report recommends a four-year term. There is no need for it. The fixed three-year term gives a better balance of accountability and stability. If it is to be changed, the people should have a direct say.