There are good reasons for abolishing double dissolutions.
The present situation provides a good example of why.
There are better ways of resolving differences between the Houses.
At present the Howard Government is stacking up the Bills for a double dissolution: Wik, public service reform, industrial relations and so on.
Later this year it will face a choice: to have a double dissolution or to have an ordinary election.
An ordinary election presents a problem for the Government. With an ordinary election only half of the Senate retires. It is unlikely the Government would get a majority in the Senate. Excluding the territories for now, 17 Coalition senators are up for re-election — three in each state except Tasmania where there are two. To increase its numbers, the Government on would need 57 per cent of the vote to crack a fourth seat in any state, or beat independent Brian Harradine in Tasmania. Not possible.
Further, only two Democrat senators are up for re-election, whereas last half-Senate election five Democrats were elected. So the Democrats would be looking for some extra seats, possibly from the Coalition.
So an ordinary election with a half-Senate election would result in much the same position or worse for the Government. It would still have a hostile Senate and critical bits of its legislation would be rejected.
Its way around this would be to have a double dissolution. The Government would still not do any better in the Senate, but at least its twice-rejected legislation would get put before a joint sitting of both Houses where it would be passed because the Government’s greater numbers in the House of Representatives would more than make up for any deficit in the Senate to give it an overall majority.
If it wants its legislation through, the Government has to go for a double dissolution; an ordinary election will not be enough. So it is likely to happen.
An incidental benefit for the Government is that a double dissolution would hurt the Democrats because all seven Democrats would be up for re-election and it is unlikely they could get more than one seat in any of the six states.
The downside of a double dissolution is that the quota for election is a low 7.7 per cent of the vote (compared to 14.3 per cent at a half-Senate election). This gives a chance to the Hanson One Nation Party, the Shooters and an assortment of one-off groups. This is the biggest drawback of a double dissolution.
There are others. The Constitution prohibits one in the last six months of the term. It must, therefore, happen before October, cutting some government time. Early elections can ultimately catch up on a government. Bob Hawke won four elections, but Labor got less than 10 years government for its effort, instead of 12.
A double dissolution also mucks up the term for senators and can put the Senate out of sync with the House. According to the Constitution, senators terms always begin on July 1, irrespective of when the election is held. But the election must be held within 12 months of them taking their position.
In a half Senate election, the term begins the July 1 (ital) after (end ital) the election. With a double dissolution, however, the term is deemed to have begun on the July 1 (ital) before (end ital) the election.
At present, the half Senate election is not due until sometime in the 12 months after July 1. So the Government cannot have an ordinary election before July 1 unless it has it without a half Senate election and having a half-Senate election on its own after July 1. Having two elections a few months apart would cause voter anger.
If it has a double dissolution, it would also wait till after July 1, because if it went before then, the senators’ terms would be back-dated to July 1, 1997, requiring the next half-Senate election (and therefore the next House election) to be held in the 12 months before July 1, 2000. That would truncate the term of the House by a year, and deprive the Government of the honour and glory of the centenary without holding a further risky election.
These provisions are quite idiotic and unnecessary. They shorten either this term or the next or both. And it is more likely we get fringe parties in the Senate. This is not good for government, but if it is the only way a government can get its Bills through, it is understanable.
Indeed, under present arrangements it is inevitable.
A better arrangement would be to abandon double dissolutions and joint sittings. Instead if the Government gets returned at the next election it should be able to pass all the bills that were rejected twice by the Senate in the previous Parliament by a simple majority in the House of Representatives.
Let’s face it, every government since World War II which had a majority in the House would have had a majority in a joint sitting. So why go through the farce (as we did in 1974). It the Government is returned it will undoubtedly have a majority in a joint sitting because its extra Reps numbers more than compensate for the small number it would be short in the Senate.
If double dissolutions were abandoned, all the trouble over the timing of subsequent elections would be avoided. The shorter terms would be avoided. The fringe groups getting a chance in the Senate would be avoided. Senators would have a fixed, secure term which would tend to force the Reps into a simultaneous three-yearly cycle.
Further, all the rejected Bills would be before the people in detail at election time, so if they re-elect the Government they would know what they would be getting. And in any event under the present system if the Government gets returned they get the Bills anyway through the joint sitting.
The double dissolution is a wasteful, disruptive unnecessary mechanism to resolve disputes between the Houses. Better to give the Senate the power to block Bills until the end of the term (a maximum of three years) and if the Government gets returned at the next ordinary election it should get its Bills through, despite the Senate and without a joint sitting. This would be fair to both sides. Howard would get Wik and workplace relations through and Whitlam would have got his various Bills through without the pain of a shortened term and a double dissolution.
And while we are at it, we should deprive the Senate of its power to reject Supply. Together, these changes would make our parliamentary terms much more stable.