A double dissolution on Wik and race would have one small element of honesty about it.
All previous double dissolutions have been created by the blockage of Bills that played virtually no part in the subsequent election campaign. Rather they were all excuses to have an early election to gain some short-term political advantage for the prime minister of the day.
With the polls the way they are, there is little short-term joy for the Prime Minister. No; it seems he wants to get his Native (disen)Title Act through and will run to a double dissolution and joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament if the Senate knocks the Bill back after the election (presuming Howard wins it).
Even so, Howard himself and most commentators suggest it will not be a race election and that economic issues will overshadow the Wik legislation. In any event, most voters will not vote on that issue alone. Many people are bored by the Wik debate or do not understand the issues so will concentrate on economic matters. People vote on total government performance not on a specific piece of legislation, so it seems the double dissolution is a discredited method of resolving a legislative deadlock between the Houses.
And history supports that view.
In mid-1914 a double dissolution was called because the Senate knocked back a Bill about voluntary unionism. But before the election was held war broke out. Labor’s Andrew Fisher, who won the election, declared Australia’s support for Britain to the last man and last shilling. Unionism took a back seat.
In 1951 the double dissolution was called because of the Banking Act, but the election was fought on communism. The Bill passed after the election.
The 1974 double dissolution was fought on three electoral matters, two health insurance Bills, and a petroleum and minerals Bill. These matters hardly rated in the election about a fair go for the 18-month-old Labor Government. The Bills passed a joint sitting.
The 1975 joint sitting was called over 21 Bills, mainly health, electoral and broadcasting matters. The Bills were dropped after Labor lost the election. They played a minor part in the election which was fought on matter of ministerial propriety and economic competence.
The 1980 double dissolution was called by Malcolm Fraser over sales tax and universities Bills which had no bearing on the election. Nor did the Australia Card in 1987. The Bill was not revived after the election even though the Hawke Government won the election.
In short the double dissolution has not worked as an efficient way of resolving deadlock between the Houses. Prime Ministers like Hawke and Fraser have used it merely as an excuse for an early election or a chance to get some extra seats in the Senate. Their success was varied.
If anything, Howard should have built on the Whitlam strategy of 1974. It was the first double dissolution based on more than one Bill. Whitlam said the rejection of six Bills was evidence of general obstructionism.
Howard should have built up a similar number: workplace relations; Telstra; tax and so on. As it is, business feel he has failed them on economic reform while many others feel he has been unnecessarily abrasive on social issues like Aboriginal rights, old people and so on.
The Constitution provides that if the Senate knocks back a Bill twice, the Government can call a double dissolution and if the Senate still rejects the Bills after the Government wins an election they can be put to a joint sitting.
In 1901, that might have seemed a good way to break a legislative deadlock. In those days there was far less legislation so each item of it represented a greater significance in a government’s program.
Nowadays we pass more than 5000 pages of the stuff each year, more than 20 times what was passed per year before World War II.
So it seems out of proportion to fight an election over just one piece of it.
Also, though we have more legislation, the legislative process is far more complex and drawn out that it was in the early years of the federation. By the time a government puts up legislation, has it considered by committees and knocked back twice it is not very long until another election is due in the ordinary course of events.
We are witnessing that now.
The issue may have some pertinence early next year when the constitutional convention meets. The republicans seem divided on the question of whether the president (leader, governor-general, chief koala, call the position what you like) should be directly elected. If there is a direct election, the Australian Republican Movement thinks (quite sensibly) that the powers of office should be codified and presumably reviewable by the High Court. This would prevent a, say, Labor president dismissing a Liberal Government or otherwise giving it a hard time under the seemingly sweeping powers given the governor-general in the present constitution.
Any code would have to address the question of resolving disputes between the two Houses. It would also have to address the other main powers of the head of state: the calling of elections; and the appointment and dismissal of governments.
It would be a terrible muddying of the waters in a debate about the republic, but there are precedents to adopt and adapt from many Commonwealth countries to make these clear cut and self-executing.
From the ACT, adopt fixed-term elections (three-years for the Reps and half the Senate). Have the chief justice preside at the first sitting with the first business the election of a Speaker who then presides over the next business which is the election of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister then selects Ministers.
From Papua New Guinea adopt the rule that a no-confidence motion in the Prime Minister must name the new Prime Minister.
From the Britain, adopt the rule that the Upper House can only delay legislation and has no power over money bills. In the Australian context that could be done by dispensing with the double dissolution which as been so inapposite. Instead the Senate could block legislation for the duration of the existing term, but if the Government is returned at the election the House of Representatives should be able to pass all the rejected legislation on its own without a joint sitting or Senate approval. After all, at that stage the people would have voted to in fact approve the measures.
From Ireland, we could adopt the practice of the president referring laws to the High Court to test constitutional questions before the law comes in to effect. So the question of whether the Parliament can enact laws to the detriment of a race and to take away remnant native title without compensation would be tested before the law began to operate.
The blend would be uniquely Australian.
It would put an end to the double dissolution farce — a sledge hammer to crack a nut and a mechanism that cheats senators who have been elected for a six-year term by the people and which propels fringe groups into the Senate on a very low quota.
As it is, Howard is forced to have a double dissolution election because a joint sitting is the only way to get his blocked Bills through.
If the people vote his government back, his Bills (like Whitlam’s in 1974) should go through without spilling the whole Senate and having a joint sitting — provided, of course, that they are consistent with the Constitution, but that’s another issue.