We can expect a lot more huffing a puffing about a double dissolution in the next year, despite this week’s back-down by the Labor Party over the work-for-the-dole scheme.
But don’t expect it to happen, because there are some fine balances in the decision whether Labor and the Democrats should provide the Government with the necessary trigger by knocking back legislation twice, and whether the Government, given the trigger, should pull it and have a double dissolution in the next 14 months or have an ordinary election with an ordinary half-Senate election in 20 months’ time.
In all the mutterings about an obstructive Senate, the face remains that the Senate has passed all the Government’s legislation.
After this week’s backdown by the Labor Party, the work-for-the-dole scheme went through, the Government does not have one piece of legislation knocked back by the Senate set to become a trigger for a double dissolution if it is knocked back a second time.
Labor obviously did not want to fight an election on the work-for-the-dole scheme. But of all the major players it stands the most to gain by having a double dissolution rather than an ordinary half-senate election, provided, of course, the issue it is called on does not itself result in a fall away of the Labor vote.
The Democrats have by far the most to lose, but seem to vote according to the issue in hand anyway. This is partly because of the Hanson factor and partly because of the difference in the way the numbers and percentages fall at a double dissolution compared to an ordinary half-Senate election.
Apart from the Hanson factor, it should make little difference to the Coalition whether the election is a double dissolution or and ordinary half-Senate election.
The tables show the picture.
I have ignored the territories which routinely return two each Labor and Coalition senators with terms that expire with the Reps. I have counted Colston as nominally Labor and his term ends in 1999.
The senators are broken down by party and by whether they are due to retire in 1999 or in 2002.
The other tables show what percentage of the vote is necessary to guarantee the pertinent numbers of senate seats in a state at a double dissolution and ordinary election. But bear in mind the last seat in each state goes on a lot lower percentage of the primary vote as preferences dribble down.
The Democrats. They Democrats have five senators retiring in 2002 and only two retiring in 1999. This is because the 1993 election was a bad one for them, whereas the 1996 election was a good one. If they repeated the 1996 performance in an ordinary senate election in 1999, they could pick up three more senators, perhaps four if they got Tasmania in the absence of a Green of the charisma of Bob Brown.
In a double dissolution, however, could only expect one senator in each state with an outside chance of two in South Australia. There is nothing to gain and plenty to lose for the Democrats in a double dissolution.
The Coalition. It is virtually impossible for the Coalition to get the 57 per cent of the vote for a fourth seat in any state in a half-Senate election. Yet getting the 43 per cent for three seats in each state is almost guaranteed, except in Tasmania where Independent Brian Harradine gets a seat. Similarly, in a double dissolution, it is difficult for the Coalition to get the 54 per cent of the vote needed to get a seventh seat in any state.
Either way, the most likely result for the Coalition is to get its 35 senators returned; no more, no less.
So the major factor driving a Coalition decision is whether it can extract any spin off in the Reps vote out of the issue at stake, though we have to bear in mind the twice rejected Bills seldom play a major part in any subsequent election campaign.
Another factor may be the effect on other parties. From the Coalition’s viewpoint a double dissolution has the advantage of hurting the Democrats, but the disadvantage in presenting the Hansonites with a lower quota target of 7.7 per cent to get a Senate seat.
Latest polls put the Hansonites at 11 per cent. That is probably not sustainable in an election context. But if the Hansonites maintain, say, 7 per cent in Queensland and WA, they could get seats in a double dissolution that would be out of reach in an ordinary half-Senate election where the quota is 14.3 per cent.
Of more significance, those seats are likely to be stolen from the Coalition. Or, more bizarrely, from the Democrats or Greens in the scramble for the last seat.
Labor. Labor has most to gain with a double dissolution, provided the issue is right. In a half-Senate election it would hold all its retiring senators, but have little chance of getting the 43 per cent needed in Queensland, WA and SA to get an extra seat. But at a double dissolution it would need only 38 per cent of the vote to get the extra seat in those states.
At a double dissolution Labor’s appalling vote in 1996 would be nullified; at an ordinary half-Senate election the fruits of it hang around until 2002.
My guess is that there will not be a double dissolution, but an ordinary half-Senate election. This is because there is nothing in it for the Coalition unless the issue is a good one for them to fight on, and although it would be good for Labor, Labor will not hand the Coalition a good issue to fight on — as the events of this week showed.
And the Hanson factor is a nasty unknown for both of them.