The position of the British Prime Minister, John Major, gets ever more precarious. The majority of his Conse4rvative party was cut to just one seat at the weekend after the death of MP Barry Porter. If Labour wins his Wirrall South constituency at a by-election and Labour retains a seat in another constituency in Northern England, Mr Major’s majority will be lost. Mr Porter held his seat for 13 years and had what in usual times would be a fairly comfortable majority. But bigger majorities have been surrendered by the Conservatives in by-elections during the course of the present parliament. And now the Conservatives lag Labour by up to 20 points in the opinion polls.
To survive any no-confidence motion or to be sure major legislation gets through Mr Major will have to rely on the nine Ulster unionist MPs. And even then he might not be secure from defections from his own ranks. Those defections could be permanently, either to Labour (there has already been one) or to the cross-benches. Or they could be just on occasional pieces of legislation, particularly with respect to Europe, because Mr Major has a significant number of Euro-sceptics in his party who are opposed to greater union and co-operation with Europe.
With such a deficit in the polls, Mr Major is likely to want to delay the next general election until May next year, the last month on which it can constitutionally be held. The choice is Mr Major’s, unless there is a successful no-confidence motion against him in the House of Commons.
In decided when to go, Mr Major should look beyond his personal interest or even that of his party. He must look at the broad national interest as well.
In 1979, the Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan faced a similar situation. His majority was crumbling and he faced a significant deficit in the polls. Labour MPs were brought to the House to vote in ambulances. He was also faced with one of the gravest economic situations for several decades with disruptive strikes and garbage piling up on the streets. The Callaghan Government was in no position to deal with it. Fortunately for Britain, he did not wait for his full term, but surrendered to the inevitable.
Mr Major is not quite in that state; nor is Britain’s economic. But his parliamentary position and his position in the polls are likely to hamstring, if not paralyse him with respect to perhaps the two most important issues in British political life: Northern Ireland and relations with Europe.
On Northern Ireland, Mr Major faces the drawback of being seen to be beholden to the unionists, and probably in fact beholden to them. Those on the republican side will see his government as biased. In any event they are likely to await the next election before taking significant steps in the peace process, such as it is, rather than dealing with a Government that relies on unionist MPs for a majority. Such a government could not be relied upon to resist a veto of any concessions to the republican side.
In Europe, Britain should be taking an active role in promoting a single currency and further economic integration with Europe. Instead, Mr Major is paralysed into the role of reluctant observer lest the Euro-sceptics humiliate him on the floor of the House. From this position of weakness, he cannot effectively dismiss every accusation of petty bureaucratic excess in Brussels by concentrating on the broad questions.
A circuit-breaking election is needed. It will either give Mr Major a workable majority, though that is unlikely, or it will give Britain a new Government which may have some hope of dealing with these crucial issues.
Mr Major should put himself out of his misery.