ON paper at least, federal political standards, though very high, have been declining for the past 20 years. The general trend is that ministerial resignations on grounds of high principle have dribbled to nothing and that resignations on grounds of alleged impropriety or short-comings have increased.
But conflict-of-interest resignations are rare; Jim Short became only the third since 1901. (I am indebted to the Parliamentary Library for digging out some details about ministerial resignations.)
Leaving aside the non-contentious resignations for electoral defeat, health, age and to take up appointments in greener pastures, what do we find? There is a marked propensity to keep the job. There have been only about 50 contentious resignations since federation among the thousands of appointments. Arguably that shows competence and diligence under fire from incessant parliamentary and public questioning that few professions endure. The largest category of contentious resignations is resignation of matters of principle. But these are concentrated in the first half of the century.
The very first ministerial resignation (Charles Cameron in 1903) was over his disagreement with the Government’s industrial-relations Bill. Other principled resignations included those over conscription in 1916, 1917 and 1918; against the reinstatement of an allegedly corrupt minister in 1920; against government policy to oppose a cut in MPs pay (!) in 1932; over government policy on Britain entering the EC in 1962; over federalism policy in 1969; over defence policy in 1971; foreign policy in 1971; over prosecution of the Sankey case in 1977; and Sydney airport in 1989.
The 1977 case, that of Bob Ellicott, and 1989, that of Gary Punch, seem to be the last resignation on grounds of policy or other principle. Arguably the cases between 1969 and 1971 were leadership tussling rather than principle.
In short (pardon the pun), high principle in Australian federal politics died in 1962 (with two exceptions, and even Punch’s could be argued to be electoral necessity).
We were spared resignations on grounds of alleged impropriety from 1901 to 1930, when Teddy Theodore was accused of fraud. He was later exonerated by an civil case and reinstated, causing two other ministers to resign in protest.
In 1938 we had the first conflict-of-interest resignation when Senator Alexander John McLauchlan resigned because he was director a Hume Pipes which was getting increasingly substantial contracts with the Postmaster-General’s Department. Two years later John Lawson resigned as Minister for Trade and Customs after leasing a racehorse from the managing director of a company negotiating with Lawson to set up a protected car industry.
Then there comes half a dozen resignations which tell us more about Gorton-McMahon leadership instability in the Liberal Party than they do about ministerial principle or propriety.
Then from 1975 till the present resignations over allegations of impropriety escalate and resignations over matters of principle virtually disappear.
From 1901 to 1975 there were only three impropriety resignations. From then till the present there were 14. To be fair most were technical.
In 1975 Jim Cairns resigned Treasury over allegations of irregularities (never finally nailed down) over loan raising. A few months later Rex Connor followed over misleading Parliament.
Of the 14, two were exonerated in court: Vic Garland who was accused of electoral bribery and Ian Sinclair accused of forging his father’s signature.
A commissioner expressed reservations over Phil Lynch’s land deals in 1977; a royal commission condemned of Reg Withers for telephoning the electoral commissioner over names of electorates. Mick Young resigned several times in the 1980s (over Ivanov, Paddington Bear and electoral donations), but was exonerated on the last.
Graham Richardson resigned in 1992 over telephoning the Marshall Islands president to inquire after an accused relative. Also in the 1990s Alan Griffith resigned (later exonerated) over the sandwich shop and Ros Kelly over the sports rorts.
What does the history tell us? Are we losing principles and getting grubbier?
Perhaps not. In the first half of the century politics was not a profession. MPs usually had other private incomes. Therefore the resignation on a point of principle was easier to take financially. The political imperative of solidarity in an age when the media makes too much of dissent is much greater so resignation on a point of principle is less likely.
Record keeping and communication has improved, especially with computerisation and photo-copying. Therefore the chance of getting caught has increased.
In Jim Short’s case, this was particularly important. For a start, there is a public registry of interests, which MPs must fill out, which was not there a couple of decades ago. In the past decade share registries have been far easier to search.
Objective standards may have be raised, giving the appearance that actual conduct is worse, though in fact it has not changed. John Howard’s guidelines, for example, are the first detailed codification of conflict of interest.
Conversely, Howard is the first Prime Minister to feel the need to codify what average voters might thinks should be instinctive.
Codification has problems. By defining in detail what is a conflict by implication we exclude all the rest, instead on relying on gut instinct.
Further rigid definition can catch the innocent (Nick Greiner) and let the guilty who escape the technical definition go free.
Further, we require a level of expertise from our ministers. But if the minister for trade or agriculture is a farmer, there is a conflict. For example, his decision to increase protection would help him and his ilk but condemn the rest of the nation to high prices. We expect finance minister to have a knowledge of finance markets which is usually best got by being in them. We like the health minister to be a doctor.
If we require divestment of all but the most liquid assets, we will turn away from politics the best people (people who often do well in the world financially).
Ultimately, it is a lost cause to define the line in advance. The politics and morality of each case as it arises tell us on which side of the line it falls.