There are three necessary requirements for a President of Indonesia. He (invariably he) must be Javanese; he must be a Muslim; and he must be a general. That rules out many.
There is also a fourth requirement, according to a joke going around Jakarta. He must have previous experience as president. And that rules out all but President Soeharto when the position is up for election in 1998.
He will be 76 then, so the question of succession is rife anyway. There appears to be great pressure for change in Indonesian society with little or no institutional means of carrying it out. Students are getting more volatile and troops have shot at demonstrators in several incidents in the past few months; workers are agitating for better conditions with increasing use of strikes; there are regional demands for greater autonomy, particularly in northern Sumatra, Timor and Irian Jaya; and a growing business class is seeking a more level competitive playing field rather than an economic and legal system in which favouritism and cronyism plays such a large part.
Balanced against that is an army of 500,000 (including the police force) which plays a dominant role in political life.
In the past few months, student and worker unrest has been met with force, though the army has be willing to prosecute officers public identified with indefensible shootings and some worker demands have been met, notably a increase in the minimum wage.
The Soeharto Government maintains that continued economic growth demands stability and unity which precludes active dissent, a lesser role for the army, greater regional autonomy or greater democratisation. Ironically, though, the greater economic prosperity gives people more time and inclination to contemplate greater and broader political and social participation.
So there is a static lid on the top of Indonesia society while the steam builds up underneath with few places to escape.
Soeharto has been president for 28 years. An election for the 1000 member People’s Consultative Assembly will be held next year and that Assembly will determine who will be president at the expiration of Soeharto’s sixth term in 1998.
This week Soeharto gave further indication he would stand again at a meeting with a group of Australian newspaper editorial executives in a rare meeting with Australian journalists who are in Indonesia for meetings with Indonesian editors organised by the Australia-Indonesia Institute.
He said that it was up to the Assembly and he would not influence it. That drew applause among his ministers as reaffirming democratic principles and acclaim that he was the only one qualified to stand.
However, Soekarno’s Golkar Party always gets between 65 and 70 per cent of the seats and the Army automatically gets 100 (to be cut to 75 next election), so there is no need for active influence. If he wants to keep the job it is his.
In particular, the first family would like him to stay on.
There has been controversy over international reportage of the granting of monopoly rights to family members in petro-chemicals, cloves and the proposal for an Indonesian car industry and various other favouritisms to family members in getting and keeping business.
Family members might be worried about any changes in the status quo. It means, of course, an increasingly personalised rule _ the law of rulers rather than the rule of law.
The worry among liberals and those who want a smooth transition is that without some change in sight next year’s election could be a catalyst for a transition that is not so smooth. If Golkar gets a vote that is so high as not to be credible it could result in people on the streets, especially after a six-week campaign when passions are stirred anyway. This could then lead to a too-heavy response and further escalation of dissent.
Other discount this and say that in the absence of an organised opposition and with a strong army in control it is more likely that the election for both the Assembly and the President the following year will go off relatively smoothly.
But that still leaves the question of succession in the case Soeharto dies or is incapacitated. His mortality came into greater focus with the death of his wife, Tien, last month.
The army, the Golkar party, the first family, Islamic groups and business will all have a say and various factions within each will form alliances with each other. But the army would have a veto.
The smoothest transition would be if the present vice-president Try Sutrisno (whom the army would accept even if he is not their favourite), succeeded under present constitutional provisions before 1998.
All up, indications this week point to Soeharto staying in power for as long as he is able, and that could mean a continual build up of pressure for change, with no institutional method for its release.