Speaker Wahono of the Indonesian Parliament called publicly this week for greater democracy.
Last week, the former head of internal security, retired general Soemitro said publicly that the next president should be a young civilian.
The week before, a former head of the Department of Defence, General Hasnan Habib publicly attacked one of President Suharto’s babies … the security treaty with Australia.
There is widespread debate, both public and private, in Indonesia about the succession to the presidency given Suharto’s term expires in 1998 when he will be 76.
Dissent and debate, up to a point, is tolerated. The precise definition of that point, however, is not clear. Tough criticism of the Army or the financial affairs of the first family is not on. It can result in a newspaper’s licence being suspended or cancelled, or an individual journalist’s licence being cancelled. Outside the press, it can result in jail terms, as evidenced by the 34-month term (under appeal) imposed on expelled MP Sri Bintang Pamungkas for calling President Suharto a dictator. Sri Bintang could well argue that the jail term became a self-proving event. Moreover, his assertion was further confirmed when he announced that he was establishing a new political party only to be met with the official response that the Constitution does not permit another political party beyond the existing three … Suharto’s Golkar, which always gets between 60 and 70 per cent of the vote, and PKI and PPP which share the rest.
The new party’s manifesto declares that the Government is a dictatorship and that corruption and nepotism are rife.
Over the past month there has been increasing evidence of growing pressure for change … for greater participation and democracy. There is increasing frustration at top-level autocracy.
Speaker Wahono’s comments and those of Sri Bintang and others can be seen as a testing of the system.
The fact that much of the commentary is allowed shows evidence of cautious liberalisation. So too is the fact that when the army reacts to demonstrations and strikes with brutality and it becomes public, the army top brass responds by prosecution of the responsible officers (even if sentences are lenient), rather than arrogantly ignoring it.
On the other hand, there is a fair amount of evidence of a lack of appreciation of democratic values, especially the rule of law, at the top.
An important example over a trivial matter occurred last week. Suharto decided that Indonesian women should not be allowed to compete in foreign beauty contests because he thought they were contrary to the principles of a major religion … Islam. He told Women’s Affairs Minister Mien Sugandhi of the ban and she made a public statement saying, “”It is strictly forbidden. It’s got to stop. End of discussion.”
This is classic law of the ruler, rather than rule of law. Sure, there is a constitutional provision about respecting religions, but internationally respected democratic principles do not allow for the executive to be judge and jury on its interpretation, and certainly not without appeal to a court or even discussion about it.
Some suspect an economic sensitivity as well as a religious one. Businesswoman Mooryati Soedibya, owner of cosmetic manufacturer PT Mustika, has sponsorship rights for future contests which cost a large sum. These are now worthless. Someone must benefit from PT Mustika’s loss.
Another example, of a lack of equality before the law is the setting up of a national car project to be owned and controlled by PT Timor Putra Nasional which is controlled by Suharto’s youngest son Hutomo Mandala Putra. PT Timor gets exclusivity and large tax breaks that others would dearly like.
None the less, Indonesia is certainly not totalitarian nor a theocracy like Iraq, Cuban or Iran with routine torture and jailings and no political discussion or opposition. People are free to travel and up to a point freedom of assembly, religion and the right to strike are allowed.
But that may not be enough. Indonesia is facing the classic political pressures that arise from economic growth. These have been seen in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines and elsewhere. The economy booms and so does education and demands for higher wages and greater participation in the affairs of companies and local and national government. Expectations increase and sometimes a triggering event will convert those expectations to action in the form of strikes and demonstrations. Indonesia has seen that in the past few months as people gear up to next year’s election for a National Assembly which in turn the following year will decide who will occupy the presidency after Suharto’s sixth term expires. Suharto himself, of course, can be re-elected just on the asking.
The Indonesian Government likes the economic growth and better education. It rightly feels that stability is an essential ingredient to growth and greater foreign investment. But ideas vary on how to achieve stability.
Suharto has to be rated a successful national leader. He had to deal with a communist insurgency and widespread violence that threatened economic and social well-being on coming to power in 1967. Since then his “”Pancasila” formula for national government, combined with a very large and politically powerful army, has kept the nation together a delivered economic growth. Pancasila means democracy through consensus, national unity (unitary government and one language), belief in one god, humanitarianism and social justice.
Understandably, he still thinks the formula is still the key to success and it may be that he might lock himself in. His family will want him to stay on largely because their economic well-being depends on his occupancy of the presidency. Of more import, the mind-set that understandably arose from the violent events of 1965 to 1967, the war over Irian Jaya and the vacuum and its consequent internal violent power struggle left by Portugal in Timor in 1975 may not be capable of change, despite the radical change in economic conditions for the better.
Suharto and the army know there is a big problem over East Timor and to a lesser extent in north Sumatra and West Irian that need a change of approach to solve, yet Suharto and most of the army have categorically ruled out any form of self-determination through fear of violence or instability that could threaten Indonesia’s considerable economic achievements.
Given the history, it is very understandable, but probably dangerous to apply strictly a formula of governance that was necessary and successful in the 1960s and 1970s in the late 1990s.
There is a large well-education middle class that resents talk from Minister’s like “”It is strictly forbidden . . . end of discussion,” however trivial the issue. It also resents special economic privileges and the rampant corruption referred to in two recent surveys of business people about Indonesia, preferring a level playing field for those who want to enter business. In travelling around Indonesia in the past two weeks, on trains and buses and moving among some of the elite, you only had to scratch the surface of polite talk for this to be obvious. But it is also obvious that people are enjoying the greater economic success and security.
It is possible and likely that accommodating both can be done gradually and peaceably, but that will depend on the reaction to the increasing public vocal dissent, student demonstrations, workers strikes and regional demands for greater participation to replace the “”security approach” of rule from the top down.
Crispin Hull travelled to Indonesia as a guest of the Australia-Indonesia Institute and also took some leave there.