The Governor of Queensland is in a different position from the Governor of other states and the Governor-General.In 1977 the Bjelke-Petersen Government (with its large majority in a single-House Parliament) put through an amendment to the Constitution Act which spelt out some elements of the exercise of the Governor’s reserve powers. In other states and the Commonwealth, the Governor relies purely on convention.
The general convention is that the Governor follows the advice of the Premier. (In this analysis Governor includes Governor-General and Premier includes Prime Minister and Chief Minister.)
There are four situations where the Governor ceases to be merely an opener of fetes and has to act as umpire of the political game:
1. When a Premier seeks an early election.
2. When a Premier is defeated on the floor of the House in a vote of no-confidence.
3. When two Houses of Parliament are in deadlock and the Government cannot get its money Bills through.
4. When an election is indecisive.
In these circumstances the general convention that the Governor does not have to follow the Premier’s advice does not necessarily apply. And the fourth situation seems likely to happen in Queensland.
It means that the Governor, normally bound to follow the Premier’s advice, need not follow it. For example, Premier Wayne Goss might say to the Governor, “”Look, the election has resulted in a hung Parliament, we ought to have another election.”
That would suit Goss. It would be tantamount to saying to the voters, “”Look I have had my kick in the backside, but it was bigger than you thought, how about _ now that I am suitably chastised _ you give me government back.”
In Queensland, however, the 1977 amendment formalises what may have become Vice-Regal practice since 1975. It says Ministers, including the Premier, “”shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor who in the exercise of his power to appoint and dismiss [them] shall not be subject to direction by any person whatsoever nor be limited as to his sources of advice”.
In other words the convention is at aught. In the Queensland situation it means that Governor Leneen Forde can ignore Goss. Of more importance she can listen to the advice of Opposition Leader Rob Borbidge and Independent Liz Cunningham. She could also listen to the Chief Justice _ though she seems to have enough legal qualifications of her own.
The position is different from the hung Parliament in Tasmania in 1989 when convention gave Premier Robin Gray the upper hand for a when he advised the Governor that he should be appointed caretaker Premier, giving him at least a chance of brokering with the Greens who held the balance. As it happened it came to nothing. Forde could easily ignore Goss and install Borbidge.
The four instances when the Governor has a role are all to do with playing electoral and political advantage to keep office. With such high stakes it would be better to tighten the rules and procedure rather than broaden the discretion.
The ACT provides an answer to three of the four uncertain circumstances by providing for fixed-term elections; by insisting the first acts of a new Parliament must be to elect a Speaker and Chief Minister; and by insisting that after a successful no-confidence motion a new chief minister must be elected.
If Australian Upper Houses were denied power over money Bills; if Lower Houses had to vote for a Speaker and Premier/Prime Minister as their first act; and if all elections for all eight Parliaments were held on, say, the first Saturday in December every three years, Governors and Governors-General could go back to opening fetes.