The very first days of Israel’s existence, every Israeli Government has enforced the policy that every Israeli citizen is a front-line soldier and that none could expect to be bailed out if taken hostage by terrorists.
Further, the Israeli Government refused to negotiate with hostage-takers.
It would do its best to rescue them militarily, but it would never meet the demands of those responsible for taking them. The taking of Israeli hostages at Entebbe Airport in Idi Amin’s Uganda was a good example.
The theory was that if you give in, they are only encouraged to do it again. The state being blackmailed is seen as a sucker for delivering cash, arms, propaganda or freedom for jailed comrades.
More than 40 years later and after some horrific hostage-takings in the 1970s and 1980s, that policy appears to be paying off. Gradually, the supporters of terrorism or sympathisers of those who engaged in it and even the terrorists themselves are giving up. They are renouncing violence and thereby meet the condition for negotiation.
The Israelis experience is occasionally cited as good reason for never dealing with terrorists, hostages-takers and black-mailers.
It has at least the virtue of consistency.
The Cambodian experience has been different. The murder (as yet unconfirmed) of Australian back-packer David Wilson and two European companions is a tragic reminder of that.
The Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in April 1975. Very quickly evidence of the killing fields mounted up.
Then the Vietnamese invaded in 198? and installed a puppet government in Phnom Penh. It may have been a Vietnamese-sponsored government, but it was a blessed relief to the Cambodian people. The ousted Khmer Rouge headed for the hinterland and engaged in a civil war.
It could have and should have been starved out of existence. Instead, for a decade, it was given succour by Thailand, the US and China out of sheer spite to Vietnam. It was given arms, money and cross-border sanctuary. It was even the officially recognised government at the United Nations.
Then when Australia’s Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, launched his peace initiative for Cambodia he accepted, indeed actively agreed, that the Khmer Rouge should have a place in the peace process.
Naturally, the Khmer Rouge reneged on the resulting deal. Since then various factions and brigades within the Khmer Rouge acted with various degrees of lawlessness and violence in an attempt to regain control of the country.
It included the taking of the three western hostages.
By then, of course, it was far too late to suddenly turn around and say, “”We won’t deal with terrorists.”
Australia, the US, China and Thailand had been supping with the devil for a decade, albeit with a long spoon.
With that history, the Khmer Rouge leaders were conditioned into believing the West would negotiate and compromise principle for pragmatism.
In that environment, it was inconsistent to say “”no negotiation”. It was also dangerous and dumb. Having displayed a track record of compromising negotiation it was asking for trouble to shut up shop when dealing with a group that has a track record of utter contempt for human life.
On this occasion Australia cried “”sheep” too often when all the time there really was a wolf.
It is bizarre that Australia could help underwrite a peace conference involving known killers and perpetrators of genocide and then a couple of years later refuse to talk.
This may seem like easy hindsight after the hostages are probably dead, but one could have every sympathy and support for the Australian position if from Year Zero (1975) when the killing fields became known it had had a consistent policy of no negotiation with murderers. Once it had gone down the path of pragmatism and dealing there was no easy going back. It may as well have continued, especially with the life of one of its own nationals at stake. It could have at least sanctioned one of the non-government organisations which had offered to negotiate.
The point is that the absolutist stand of never negotiate is only sometimes correct. It depends on the context.
That context requires weighing up whether negotiation will result in encouraging future kidnappings or terrorism; whether any ransom paid will go to further bloodshed (or be just squandered on a binge for the troops); and the nature of the risk to the hostages.
In this case, the Khmer Rouge has no track record of international operations or operations in high population areas like Palestinian fringe groups, the IRA, or the Red Brigades so the risk of future kidnappings is not as great. The kidnapping group seems to be semi-autonomous and isolated from much of the rest of the Khmer Rouge so passing ransom money for future operations is less likely. Further, with defections and a fair degree of disorganisation within the Khmer Rouge it is less likely that ransom money will be used in a “”disciplined” way for future kidnappings rather than squandering on individual desires. And the risk to the hostages was greater in this instance than most, given the track record of the Khmer Rouge.
On balance, more a case for negotiation than a stand-off.
The policy failure is made more tragic by this week’s events. If perchance Australia had allowed some third-party mediator in and had secured the hostages’ release, the capture this week of the stronghold where they had been held might have resulted in both the bringing to justice of the kidnappers and the guarantee that any ransom money would not have been used for future operations.