The phoney election campaign over the past month presents a clear case for fixed-term Parliaments. One of the objections to fixed terms has been that they result in long campaigns because politicians know when the election will be held and start campaigning well in advance. America is cited as an example. But in the past month we have had a de-facto election campaign precisely because we do (ital) not (ital) know the election date.
If we had a fixed three year term, the election date would be know … say, March 16 … and the two parties could have a Bex and good lie down until, say, the beginning of February. There would be no wastage of ammunition in a phoney war.
There is no good reason why the government side should get the advantage of setting the date. Fairness suggests that all contestants should be able to plan with a set date in mind. It might improve government if policies were developed in the knowledge of the election date well-known. The present phoney campaign has resulted in a silly cat-and-mouse game the Government playing on Opposition paranoia of releasing policies too early because they might get subjected to a scare campaign.
The experience of the past month shows that the uncertainty of the unfixed term unsettles markets and disrupts business and social planning in a far greater way than the possibility of a long campaign before a fixed-date election.
It seems the only time the drawn out campaign is avoided is when a snap early election is called. The history of them shows they are merely called to exploit some short-term political advantage.
Once a government looks like going the full-term election speculation and campaign mood ensues well in advance anyway. And in days of public funding … $30 million this time … this will get worse.
With fixed terms, governments would get a more suitable term for economic planning and taking a longer policy view: three years not the present average of just over two.
Politicians say a longer term can be achieved with a four-year unfixed term. This is only because they want to keep the power of selecting the election date. It also causes problems with the Senate, whereas fixed terms would always result in simultaneous Senate and House elections.
Fixed terms give the opportunity to fit elections more appropriately in the business and social seasons. For example, all federal, state and territory elections could be held on the first Saturday in December every three years. It would give any new governments the Christmas-New Year period to settle in.
Political journalists would not like a fixed term because election-date speculation constitutes a significant part of their copy. Another significant part comes from leadership speculation. That could be cured, of course, with an annual, automatic spill of party leadership positions. It would be a formality most of the time, but a fixed-time process would stop the sort of mindless leadership destabilisation that has prevented concentration on policy on both sides of politics.
Of course, journalists would also have to concentrate on policy issues, heaven forbid.
Of course, fixed-terms cannot happen without a constitutional referendum. Such a referendum would probably be passed easily. The problem is that it will never be put. Governments never put referendum questions that might reduce their own powers, and under present arrangements governments as a general rules have to approve the putting of all referendum questions.
The Catch 22 is that no Government would put a referendum question that would change the way referendums are approved.
The history of chronic rejection of referendums shows the wrong questions were put, not that the answers were wrong. This has certainly been true of questions on parliamentary terms. All have been rejected. None has proposed a fixed term.
The method of proposing changes the Constitution should be widened when we become a Republic. And incidentally, a fixed term would result in the President having one less contentious duty … approving early elections.