The Labor Party announced last week that it is seeking to expunge the ghost of its East Timor policy through two parliamentary inquiries. And it does not mind if that means a certain amount of mea culpa and a certain amount of questioning the conduct of some of the party’s more revered (and less revered) figures, such as Gough Whitlam and Gareth Evans.
In doing so, however, a parliamentary inquiry is likely to unearth some interesting material about the role of the Coalition and some of its more revered figures, such as Malcolm Fraser. Provided, of course, that the right questions are asked of the right people.
Remember, the East Timor invasion took place on December 7, 1975, less than a month after the dismissal of the Whitlam Government and just five days after the election of the Fraser Government. At the time, and in the immediate period before the invasion, the Australian Government was in a state of turmoil and policy vacuum. Events in the Indonesian archipelago were among the last thing on the mind of both sides of politics. Moreover, from November 11 until December 2, the Government was Fraser’s caretaker one.
Remember, too, that events in East Timor itself were utterly chaotic with the unilateral (and irresponsible) withdrawal by Portugal and the Cold War was in full swing in every Third World power struggle.
The inquiries Labor is seeking centre around the deaths of the five journalists in East Timor and around Government policy. Only fresh information from Indonesia can do much about the former, but the conduct of Australian policy is likely to be fully documented.
The popular feeling is that somehow that then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam gave the nod to an Indonesian invasion by telling Indonesia after the Portuguese withdrawal that Australia thought that East Timor was in the Indonesian sphere of influence. If only, the feeling goes, Australia had been tougher in insisting on a UN-supervised election, Indonesia might not have invaded.
But even if that view is right, it ignores the crucial time from November 11, 1975 to the invasion on December 7 when Malcolm Fraser was Prime Minister.
Here are some questions that a parliamentary inquiry ought to ask:
Did President Suharto make any approach to the Fraser Government asking about its attitude on East Timor? (Answer almost certainly, yes).
Did the Fraser Government respond? (Answer almost certainly, yes)
How did it respond? (Most probably by saying we are a caretaker government and cannot change any policies, but perhaps with some wording respecting Indonesia’s interests. The inquiry should search out the precise response.)
How was the response conveyed? (Most probably by the Prime Minister to the Department of Foreign Affairs, then headed by John Menadue, and then through the Ambassador, then Richard Woolcott.)
Mr Woolcott has consistently said he is happy to respond to any governmental or parliamentary inquiry. It is clear that as a diplomat he is in no position to volunteer; he has to be asked by a properly constituted inquiry.
Did the response mention what would be Coalition policy if it were elected on December 2? (Answer probably no, desipte Fraser having well-developed policy positions on virtually everything else.)
Or did it just state the caretaker position? (Answer probably yes.)
What did the Indonesians, particularly President Suharto, say at the time the Australian response was presented? What was formally sent back to the Australian Government?
A critical question would also be: was the use of force mentioned by anyone on either side. If so who mentioned it and when?
Was there any ambiguity in any message sent by the Fraser Government? (Answer probably yes.)
Did the message mention UN involvement or an act of self-determination? (Answer probably no.)
Did the Fraser Government communicate with the Indonesian Government about East Timor after the December 2 election? (Answer probably not. But it would not have made any difference because the invasion plan was under way with Indonesia factoring in any earlier response.)
These questions and answers, of course, are just the idle, ill-informed speculation of a journalist, but I imagine that failings in Australia over Timor were bi-partisan ones and these inquiries will find that if they ask the questions.
Moreover, it is very pertinent that Whitlam was not in power in the critical period from November 11 to December 7. If Whitlam did give a nod and a wink to Indonesia earlier, the Fraser Government did nothing to reverse it. If any Whitlam statement was misread as a nod and a wink to invade, then the Fraser Government did nothing to correct it. Indeed, its messages to Indonesia (at least as they left Australia) probably were in exactly the same vein.
This Government may, of course, seek executive privilege to prevent government documents being turn over, in which case we will have to wait another seven years under the 30-year rule in the Archives Act. But this Government might see some advantage in watching Labor hang out its dirty washing. It might therefore allow all documents to be examined by both the joint parliamentary committee and the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. If it does, however, it should prepare itself for some examination of the Fraser Government’s role.