HISTORY has become unfashionable. In universities it has had to compete with sociology and communications for the hearts (and sometimes the minds) of students. Superficially, the information age makes history less important. We have so much information preserved and stored that there is no room for the historian to tell the story.
A example arose last week, however, that shows the “”information-communications” explosion makes history even more important.
The book, “”The Last Shilling. A History of Repatriation in Australia” was launched. Sounds dry, but it is written with verve, sympathy and an eye for human interest. The bit on Agent Orange interested me.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s Vietnam veterans were agitating for a better deal and better recognition. They felt that the widespread opposition to the war was resulting in them getting less sympathy than other veterans, and because of the nature of the war (it was not a “”real” one), they were getting less respect than other veterans.
Following the US trend, they did not rely solely on existing ex-service organisations, but set up their own Vietnam Veterans’ Association, and then used four things to achieve their aims: the media, Agent Orange, suicides and post-traumatic shock syndrome.
It worked. I’m sure most people think even now that Vietnam vets have higher than average numbers of deformed children and have other medical problems because of Agent Orange; that they have a higher rate of suicide; that the peculiarities of Vietnam gave rise to more post traumatic stress syndrome; and that the repatriation system was too stringent.
Those messages were delivered through the media. I know; I helped deliver them.
But they are wrong, as the authors of The Last Shilling, Clem Lloyd and Jacqui Rees, point out with force and fact.
I do not blame the media. Reporters accurately reported the statements of the VVA leaders and also the statements of those with a contrary view, though the VVA view got greater prominence, was taken up by pop singers and stuck. This is the information-communications age. And thus the importance of history: looking at things from a greater distance, freed from the imperative of presenting the new and sensational and from manipulation by people with something to gain.
At the time, the vets had plenty to gain. The Labor Government, too, wanted further vindication of its anti-Vietnam War stand. Nasty Agent Orange was there for both and the message was pushed, even after the Evatt Royal Commission (after exhaustive inquiry) concluded there was little exposure of troops to herbicide and no link between it and deformities. The deformity rate was no different and the health of vets was better than the general male population of that age group.
Lloyd and Rees wrote that one of the disadvantages facing the VVA in presenting its case against Agent Orange was the large amount of documentation on troop movements, patterns of spraying, Landsat photographs, weather reports and other material that was difficult to refute.
It enabled the department to isolate the only group which might have been sprayed and monitor their health. The upshot, as the Royal Commission concluded, was that the link was not there or certainly not proven. The VVA was invited to put up their best 10 cases. None passed the test.
As to stringency of benefits, the DVA positively searched for a link and was happy to pay if it was found.
Also, Vietnam vets’ actual suicide statistics are different from the impression that more vets died from suicide than action. 425 died in action and 69 in non-battle casualties. Of 987 post-Vietnam deaths known at August 4, 1986, 109 were definitely suicides with six probables _ lower than the average rate for Australian males of the same age and far lower than the battle deaths.
It is fine to argue Australia’s role in Vietnam was immoral. And yes, let’s argue that Vietnam vets deserve generous treatment and recognition. But relying on myths to do it does no-one any credit and can harm the vets’ cause by tying the system up and draining precious funds with cases of little or no merit.
The best thing about good history is its honesty.
(small ital) The Last Shilling (MUP 476pp) was financed by the DVA but with no editorial control.