The Republic Advisory Committee said yesterday that there was a powerful case for codifying the reserve powers of the Head of State and the conventions used in the exercise of those powers.
At present the Constitution says the Governor-General may appoint and dismiss ministers, including the Prime Minister, and dissolve the House of Representatives and call and election. No rules are set down about the exercise of those powers. Conventions say the person who commands a majority on the floor of the House of Representatives is appointed Prime Minister and elections are called when the Prime Minister advises they be called.
An issues paper made public by the committee yesterday said, “”The scope of all these powers is contentious. The committee’s objective must be to ensure that all republican options maintain and reflect out representative parliamentary democracy. In the light of that objective, there is a powerful case for determining what, if any, reserve powers should be vested in the House of State and recording them in precise language either in the Constitution or legislation.”
Leaving them in their uncertain state meant a potential for the Head of State to be embroiled in political controversy. The Head of State should be a non-partisan representative of the nation, above party politics. The reserve powers, therefore was, arguably, the most important aspect of the committee’s work.
The committee said the issue was related to the appointment of the Head of State. It asked, “”Would it be appropriate to leave the reserve powers in their current undefined stated if the Head of State is appointed by some method of parliamentary, popular or other election?
“Any system of appointing the Head of State which differs from the current one sq(appointment and dismissal in effect by the Prime Minister) may be seen as conferring on the appointee an aura of greater political authority that is presently the case. It follows therefore that a clearer definition of the nature and extent of the reserve powers of the Head of State will be of particular importance.”
It canvassed several methods:
Nomination by the Prime Minister and ratification by either: 1. A simple majority in joint sitting (in which case the Government would usually have a majority); 2. A simple majority of each house sitting separately (in which case some cross-party support would be necessary); 3. Two-thirds majority of a joint sitting; or 4. Two-thirds majority of each House.
Nomination by any Member of Parliament and ratification by one of the above four methods.
Nomination and election by an electoral college drawn from outside state and federal parliaments.
Popular election.
The committee thought at electoral college could usurp the sovereignty of Parliament and that a direct election “”may give a Head of State the impression that he of she has a popular mandate equal to or greater than the Government, which extends his or her authority beyond the relatively limited functions of a non-executive Head of State.
It thought that a process of parliamentary scrutiny might deter some candidates. Further, it would inevitably result in the Head of State being a contest between party nominees _ in other words a politician.
(A recent opinion poll suggested that more than 80 per cent thought the President should be elected by the people and less than 10 per cent thought the President should be elected by Parliament. Once the issues are clearer, however, this likely to change.)
It suggested a problem with parliamentary ratification.
“”It is probably fair to say that many of those people who have filled the office of Governor-General would not have agreed to be considered for that position if the process of appointment had be a contested one,” it said.
It asked whether the Head of State should have a fixed term and should there be any qualifications other than being an adult Australian citizen, such as age or not being a Member of any Parliament for a set period.
It said removal of a Head of State was an issue: dismissible by the Prime Minister? by the courts or reviewable by the courts? by Parliament on misbehaviour or by a two-thirds majority?
If dismissible on grounds of misbehaviour, should a definition of misbehaviour be put in the constitution?
the committee thought the choice of removal would be influenced by the view taken on the Head of State’s powers.
It had two options for the states: leaving them as is to determine themselves if they wanted the Queen as head of state or changing the Constitution to provide that governors of states will be Australian citizens and will not represent any person who holds an official position in another country.
The committee will advertise a 008 number at the weekend for any citizen to ring to get copies of the paper. It asked that submissions address the terms of reference (what sort of republic) not whether there is to be a republic or monarchy.