Obama and Libya: so far so good

LIKE most US Presidents, Barack Obama is copping it from the left and the right — this time over the intervention in Libya. From the left came the chant either that he should have gone in earlier to save civilians or that he should not have gone in at all because it will be just another (the third) US armed intervention into a Muslim country which is bound to escalate and bog down.

The US military will do what it always does: demand more troops from the President and the President will give them, the argument runs, and Obama, like Johnson and Nixon will be harmed or destroyed by the intervention.

From the right comes the suggestion that the new intervention proves that President George W. Bush was right to go into Iraq, topple its dictator, save its people, and install a democracy.

I don’t buy any of those arguments. Obama is a different sort of President. The way he has dealt with the wars he inherited – Iraq and Afghanistan – shows that, as has the way he has dealt with Libya so far.

Like most Presidents he is haunted, or at least informed, by the errors of wars that have gone before. But unlike most Presidents before him, he has insisted on a clear objective and a strategy to achieve them.

Most American wars have been marked by confused aims. Even Abraham Lincoln was unsure as to whether the retention of the union would be paramount over ending slavery in the Civil War. The US role in World War II was a muddle between revenge for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour or the general defence of democracy.

During the Cold War there were any number of strategically misguided foreign forays by the US military.

Perhaps the most confused strategies were those of George W. Bush’s forays into Afghanistan and Iraq. Was the Afghan invasion aimed at killing Osama bin Laden as revenge for the 9/11 bombings; destroying his Al Qaeda organisation so there could be no further attacks; punishing or destroying the Taliban Government for harbouring Al Qaeda; or destroying the Taliban Government and establishing democracy in Afghanistan as a bulwark against terrorism, or all or some of the above?

As Bob Woodward reveals in his book Obama’s Wars, it was fully eight years after the invasion that the White House, under Obama, sorted out what was the US’s primary aim, which was to destroy or at least substantially weaken Al Qaeda because it posed a threat to the US. But by then, of course, Al Qaeda had moved to Pakistan.

All military action would be justified with reference to Al Qaeda. Obama poured more US troops into Afghanistan to ensure Al Qaeda felt it unsafe to return there, keeping them in Pakistan where they were easier to strike.

At the bidding of Vice-President Joe Biden Obama recognised the difference between the Taliban and Al Qaeda and that the Taliban might take a role in a future Afghan Government that would be utterly opposed to Al Qaeda returning from Pakistan.

Shortly after it became Obama’s war, thoughts of an Afghan democracy, nation-building and a counter-insurgency went to the back seat as far as the White House was concerned, even if the military might have thought differently.

In Iraq, Bush’s primary aim and strategy were confused. Was it to secure oil for the West; to prevent terrorists harboured by Iraq from attacking the US; to prevent the Iraqi Government from using weapons of mass destruction against the US or its allies; or to tidy up Daddy’s earlier Iraq war? Or all or some of the above.

Underlying the foray was the legally dodgy doctrine of preventative war, under which the US, Britain, Australia and a couple of others subscribed to the idea that invading another country would be justified if you thought they posed a threat to you. Subjective tests are usually self-serving and suspect and in this instance contrary to international law.

Obama has now crystallised his aims and strategy in Iraq. He would never have gone in, but having gone in, the US should get out as quickly and safely as possible.

In both these wars, Obama has persistently refused to sign blank cheques to the military for more troops and weapons. When he boosted troop strength is Afghanistan it was less than the military wanted.

According to Woodward, he constantly engaged a wide range of advisers and invited contrary views, unlike Bush who preferred his numerous one-to-ones with Vice-President Dick Cheney, whose view of the world was decidedly driven by self-interest and often ignorant or wrong.

In Libya Obama did not inherit a war. It has been his from the start. So far, so good. And the projection looks good.

The difference is profound. The aim is firm: to protect Libyan civilians from their own government. The means are clear: a no-fly zone and aerial bombardment of Libyan Government forces intent on killing civilians which would be enforced collectively under a UN Security Council resolution with no ground forces.

Other things are not aims, just side effects: whether the Libyan Government falls; whether Gaddafi flees or is killed; whether any new government is democratic, theocratic or despotic.

In a way, the Libyan action is law enforcement under the UN Responsibility to Protect rules. The US is part of the international police force, not a military adventurer driven by selfish national interest.

Importantly, the aim is achievable. Libya, by and large, is open territory so government military convoys are exposed and can be stopped or destroyed fairly easily.

The critical test will be to avoid ground troops. As soon as foreign troops go in they will turn from liberators to occupiers, as in Iraq. It was also the case in Northern Ireland. British troops were initially welcomed by Catholics as protectors. They soon became occupiers and targets.

Obama has already achieved a lot in Libya. He will not be accused, like President Bill Clinton of inaction or prolonged dithering which allowed the genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.

The projection here is that the US will achieve its stated aim: that with others Libyan civilians will be protected from slaughter by their own government and no ground troops will go in. Thereafter what happens will be up to Libyans on the ground. At the very worst a murderous regime will be replaced by some other less than ideal, but not murderous, government .
CRISPIN HULL
This article first appeared in The Canberra Times on 2 April 2011.